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NOTES
SOVEREIGNTY UNDER RESERVATION: AMERICAN INDIAN
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IN LAW AND PRACTICE*
INTRODUCTION
For anyone unfamiliar with the field of Indian law, the notion of
tribal sovereignty probably suggests a subject of arcane historical inter-
est with limited relevance to contemporary conditions. In fact, how-
ever, the subject of Indian tribal sovereignty continues to be a focal
point for heated debate and litigation with profound ramifications ex-
tending far beyond the Indian community.' Under the banner of tribal
sovereignty, some American Indian tribes have recently won multi-mil-
lion dollar settlements for the illegal appropriation of aboriginal lands,'
while other tribes have sought to achieve a greater degree of self-deter-
mination by asserting control over the development of reservation re-
sources for the benefit of tribal members.'
Sovereignty has traditionally been defined as the power and au-
thority which a government may exercise over the persons and prop-
erty within its domain." In the contemporary world, where nation-
states assert exclusive but often conflicting claims of sovereign author-
ity, sovereignty is often used as a synonym for state power.5 In this
context, sovereignty signifies not only the supremacy of the state in its
internal or domestic structure of authority, but also the independence
of the state in its external relations with other sovereign entities.6 Al-
* The author of this Note received the 1984 Dr. Ernst Stiefel Award.
1. See generally Mettler, A Unified Theory of Indian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 89 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Maine Indian Settlement Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1785 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1721-35 (Supp. V 1982)).
3. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Goldberg, A Dynamic
View of Tribal Jurisdiction to Tax Non-Indians, 40 LAW & CoNrrss. PRoBS. 166, at n.2
(1976); N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A16, col. 1.
4. J. FAwcETr, THE LAW OF NATIONs 31 (1969). The sovereignty of a state has more
recently been defined as "the residuum of power which it possesses within the confines
laid down by international law." J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 113
(8th ed. 1977).
5. D. NINCIt, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRAcTIcE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 5 (1970).
6. Id. See also M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (1982),
where the author discusses the problems involved in preserving sovereign equality while
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though sovereign powers are often described as unlimited or absolute,'
the powers of all sovereign governments are always subject to the coun-
tervailing claims asserted by all other sovereignties in a continuously
shifting balance of economic, political and military power.' Thus, while
all sovereign governments claim the right to absolute independence
within their respective spheres of jurisdiction,9 the actual exercise of
sovereign power in any specific case is invariably limited by the domes-
tic and international context in which such powers are asserted. 0
Prior to the emergence of an independent American nation, the
Indian tribes were considered to be sovereign political entities." Tribal
governments were regarded as fully independent, both internally with
regard to their exclusive authority over tribal members and tribal
property, as well as externally with regard to their competence to
maintain the relations of peace and war with other sovereign govern-
ments."3 Over the course of the last two hundred years, however, Amer-
ican Indian tribes have relinquished the external incidents of sover-
eignty to the United States,"3 while retaining many of the domestic
attributes of sovereignty over tribal members and resources.' 4 Thus,
although tribal governments are not currently recognized as indepen-
dent sovereigns in the international arena, American Indian tribes have
continued, nevertheless, to exercise limited sovereign powers as the
rightful heirs to the historic legacy of the first sovereign governments
in America.
In contrast to the traditional view that the internal relations of a
sovereign state are beyond the scope of international law,'" there is an
simultaneously recognizing or promoting the right of self-determination under interna-
tional law.
7. D. NINCIt, supra note 5, at 6-8. The author cites the German Third Reich as the
most extreme example of absolute sovereignty. Id. at 8.
8. Id. at 12-13. See also M. POMERANCE, supra note 6, at 2.
9. D. N1NcIt, supra note 5, at 12-13. The principle that all states have the right to
protect their territorial integrity and political independence is also enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
10. D. NINcIl, supra note 5, at 9-13.
11. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 530 (1832).
12. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515, 530 (1831).
13. Id. at 17. The external incidents of sovereignty include the power to negotiate
international agreements and establish alliances with foreign nations. Id.
14. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 46, 122-50 (1942). The Su-
preme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), analogized the position
of the Indian tribes to that of the feudal states of Europe which were considered to be
sovereign despite their-alliances with more powerful nations. Id. at 561.
15. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (1952). According to
Kelsen "international law does not impose upon the state any obligations concerning the
treatment of its own nationals." Id.
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emerging trend toward recognition that a state's domestic policies are
no longer considered completely immune from international scrutiny.16
In recent years, the principle of self-determination has gained consid-
erable international support17 as the number of independent states rec-
ognized as sovereign by the international community has grown at an
increasingly rapid rate.18 Although the American Indian peoples are
not, at present, seeking to achieve international recognition as inde-
pendent from the United States, 9 many tribes are asserting claims of
tribal sovereignty in support of their demands for self-determination
and a greater degree of control over their internal affairs."'
At present, there are over two hundred Indian reservations located
within twenty-six states, which comprise a total land area of approxi-
mately fifty million acres.2 1 Recent estimates of the mineral resources
on Indian lands indicate that there are substantial deposits on at least
forty reservations which may account for as much as three percent of
the total United States reserves of oil and gas (4.2 billion barrels of oil
16. See I. DELuPis, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 6 (1974). The
War Crimes Trials at Nuremberg provide the most vivid example of this trend. Id. Inter-
national recognition of the right of colonial peoples to self-determination has also been
cited in support of the view that sovereign powers are increasingly subject to both inter-
nal and external constraints. Id. at 14-18.
17. Id. at 13. The right to self-government is emerging as a rule of international law.
Id. at 14. See also M. POmERANCE, supra note 6.
18. I. DELupIs, supra note 16, at 10. The number of independent states recognized by
the United Nations has tripled since 1945. Id. Recognition of the right of self-determina-
tion requires a continuing realignment of the relations between existing and emerging
states because "every demand for self-determination involves some countervailing claim
or claims." M. POMERANCE, supra note 6, at 2. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1983, at
A15, col. 1. The people of the Palau islands, who live under a United Nations Trustee-
ship administered by the United States, recently voted on a Compact of Free Association
with the United States. The Compact proposed to return home rule to the Palauan peo-
ple while reserving nearly one third of the main island to the United States for long term
use as a military training ground and permitting the limited use or transport of radioac-
tive materials as a waiver of the Palauan constitutional provision that declares the area
to be a nuclear free zone. The people of Palau rejected the nuclear waiver portion of the
Compact, and though the remainder of the Compact passed, under Palauan law the
whole Compact failed. Id.
19. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITIcAL LimERT "
275 (1980). But see V. DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS (1969), where the author, a
well-known Indian leader, warns of potential violence unless the Federal Government
supports Indian efforts at self-determination. Id. at 266.
20. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A16, col. 3. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Recently, Canadian Indians have asserted claims to land and
other rights of self-government under the banner of tribal sovereignty. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 17, 1983, at A3, col. 3.
21. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN PoLicy REvIEw COMM'N, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., FINAL REPORT 7
(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
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and 17.5 trillion cubic feet of gas) and between seven and thirteen per-
cent of the total United States coal reserves (100-200 billion tons).22
Although some Indian tribes have leased communal lands for mineral
exploitation in the past, increasing demand for non-renewable energy
resources and declining domestic production have combined to spur a
renewed interest in the exploitation of tribal mineral resources."3 In
response to the rising demand for domestic energy and the need to
generate jobs and income on the reservation, some tribal governments
have recently begun to assert control over the development of reserva-
tion resources under the claim of Indian tribal sovereignty.
2 4
This note will examine the history, scope and contemporary rele-
vance of the doctrine of Indian tribal sovereignty with particular em-
phasis upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which
address the problems and policies behind the continuing controversy
over Indian self-determination. Section I of this paper will trace the
historical development of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty through a
discussion of Indian treaties, acts of Congress and constitutional limi-
tations upon the exercise of tribal sovereign powers. In section II, re-
cent cases will be examined to determine the present scope of tribal
self-government and the limits upon tribal, state and federal powers.
Section III will conclude with a discussion of the future prospects for
tribal self-government in America.
I
The origins of the present controversy over Indian sovereignty
may be traced back to the early period of colonization when the native
peoples were regarded as "numerous, powerful and truly indepen-
dent."' 5 In their quest for control over the New World, colonial powers,
principally England, France and Spain, claimed sovereignty over their
respective colonies by virtue of the priority of discovery.2" Although
22. Id. at 338-39. Other reservation resources include large phosphate and uranium
deposits, stands of commercially saleable timber and substantial acreage in range and
cropland. Id. at 314, 324, 339.
23. See Note, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe: Tribal Power to Tax Non-Indian
Lessees Who Exploit Reservation Natural Resources, 26 S.D.L. REv. 595 (1981).
24. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), where the Supreme
Court upheld the tribal power to tax mineral production on the reservation. On the Nav-
ajo reservation, where unemployment was recently estimated at 80%, the newly elected
Chairman of the tribe has vowed to renegotiate outdated energy contracts and to use
tribal resources first for the benefit of tribal members. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at
A16, col. 1.
25. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
26. M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1969). See also F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMA-
TIVE YEARS 140 (1970).
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these European nations claimed absolute dominion over their colonial
territory as against their European rivals, each colonial power also rec-
ognized that the natives possessed the aboriginal right of occupancy
which could not be divested by the mere act of discovery. 7 Conse-
quently, despite each nation's claim of absolute title to all of the terri-
tory within its respective domain, the European nations also recog-
nized that the transfer of actual possession of occupied land sought for
colonization could only be achieved through conquest or the negotia-
tion of an agreement of cession with the native inhabitants."5
Contrary to the popular notion that most of the land acquired
from native peoples was gained by conquest,2" the historical fact is that
the acquisition of possessory rights to native property in America oc-
curred primarily through cession agreements negotiated with the
tribes.80 While the validity of these cessions may be challenged on the
basis that the natives were unfamiliar with European languages and
property concepts,8" it is, nevertheless, apparent that in negotiating
these agreements, the European powers implicitly recognized the ab-
original tribes as possessing the sovereign right to cede the territory
which the Europeans sought to acquire.2 In order to gain cessions of
tribal property, colonial governments offered the natives access to
trade goods's and protection from interference by colonists and rival
colonial powers.2 4 Among the British colonies, local authorities were
charged with enforcement of the Crown's generally conciliatory Indian
27. M. LINDLEY, supra note 26. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
where Justice Marshall stated:
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quar-
ter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabi-
tants of the other, or over the lands they occupied, or that the discovery of ei-
ther by the other should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered,
which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors.
Id. at 543.
28. M. LINDLEY, supra note 26, at 44.
29. See M. WAX, INDIAN AMERICANS: UNITY AND Dit'EsrrY 43 (1971).
30. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 35-37 (1947).
31. See P. JACOBS & S. LANDSAY, To SERVE THE DEVIL: NATIVEs AND SLAVES 21 (1971).
Land was communally owned in most native societies, and was not considered to be a
commodity which could be given away or sold. Id.
32. See M. LINDLEY, supra note 26, at 44. The author states that the "power of mak-
ing an agreement. . . implies the ability to refuse to make such an agreement, and is a
mark and test of independence." Id.
33. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 7. The British tried to regulate the sale of alco-
hol and firearms, but due to the widely scattered frontiers and the lack of cooperation by
local officials, trade with the natives was practically unrestricted. Id. at 9-10.
34. Id. at 6-10. See also C. PHILLIPSON, WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
66-67 (1916).
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policy,35 but competition between the colonies over the acquisition of
land and trade with the natives often prevented effective enforcement
of these measures at the local level." Consequently, native complaints
over the continuing encroachment on tribal lands and the notoriously
unscrupulous dealings of the traders often went unanswered. They
were a major source of hostility among the natives throughout the colo-
nial period.8 7
The European nations also sought the support of the tribes as mil-
itary allies in conflicts with rival colonial powers.38 To the dismay of
British colonial authorities, many Indian tribes had thrown their sup-
port to the French in the 1754 war against England. 9 In an attempt to
remedy this situation, Britain completely revised its Indian policy in
the famous Proclamation of 1763,40 which established the first official
boundary line between Indian land and that of the colonies. " The new
British policy of providing more aggressive protection of Indian lands
and tribal autonomy eventually won the support of many tribes which,
in response, joined with the British against France, Spain and even the
United States.42
By the time the American colonies declared themselves indepen-
dent from Great Britain, the broad contours of the colonial Indian pol-
icy were well established.4 '3 The Indian tribes were considered by the
colonial powers as fully capable of maintaining the relations of peace
and war and governing themselves under the protection of their colo-
nial allies.4 4 The acquisition of native territory was customarily accom-
plished through negotiation with the tribes.4 5 Provisions were often in-
cluded in treaties between the colonial powers which specified that
prior agreements with the tribes were to be enforced by the successor
35. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 9.
36. Id. at 8-11.
37. Id.
38. See Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United
States, 31 GEo. L.J. 1, 19-20 (1942).
39. F. PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 11.
40. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA, 119-23 (A.
Short & A. Doughty eds. 1907). For a discussion of the Proclamation of 1763, see Cum-
MING & MICKENBERG, NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA 27-31 (2d ed. 1972). See also F. PRUCHA,
supra note 26, at 13-17.
41. F. PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 13. The official boundary was set at the Appalachian
Mountains, and the settlement or purchase of land within Indian territory was prohib-
ited. Id. at 14.
42. See Cohen, supra note 38.
43. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 26, at 5.
44. See, e.g., C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 34, at 66-67.
45. Id. at 66.
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state.4 Thus, despite the absence of highly developed socio-political
hierarchies within most aboriginal societies at the point of contact,47
the Indian peoples were almost uniformly regarded by the European
powers as possessing many of the attributes that are customarily asso-
ciated with sovereignty.4
In the aftermath of the American Revolutionary War, the United
States succeeded to the claims of Great Britain,4' and continued to re-
gard the friendly Indian tribes as dependent allies whose right to oc-
cupy aboriginal lands was to be protected. The Northwest Ordinance
of 1789, for example, stated that Indian "land and property shall never
be taken from them without their consent . . . unless in just and law-
ful wars authorized by Congress."'" In order to preserve peaceful rela-
tions with the native population and to ensure the orderly transfer of
aboriginal lands to the government, Congress enacted the first of many
Indian Non-Intercourse Acts in 1790, which declared that any acquisi-
tion of Indian lands would be invalid unless accomplished by treaty
entered into pursuant to the Constitution.2
Federal authority over Indian affairs has traditionally rested on
two separate provisions of the United States Constitution. 3 Under the
express terms of the Commerce Clause, Congress is vested with the
exclusive power to "regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."" Of equal im-
portance to the exercise of federal control over Indian affairs is the
46. See, e.g., Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, Apr. 30, 1803, United
States-France, 8 Stat. 200, T.I.A.S. No. 86. Under one provision of this agreement, the
United States promised to execute all treaties which had been agreed upon between
Spain and the tribes. Id. art. VI.
47. See M. WAX, supra note 29 at 3-6. The Maya, Aztec and Inca cultures, with their
comparatively complex socio-political hierarchies, were considered the most highly devel-
oped native states, and as such, exceptions to the general pattern of tribal organization
found among most aboriginal societies. Id.
48. Id. at 45.
49. Preliminary Articles of Peace, Nov. 30, 1782, United States-Britain, 8 Stat. 54,
T.I.A.S. No. 102.
50. See C. PHILLIPSON, supra note 34, at 67; F. PRUcHA, supra note 26, at 142.
51. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, art. III, 1 Stat. 50.
52. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976)). By preempt-
ing the right of the states as well as individuals in the drive to acquire land from the
tribes, Congress sought to minimize conflict while promoting westward settlement. See
Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: lnherent
Right or Congressional License?, 51 NoTR DAME LAW. 600, 608-09 (1976).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Indians are also ex-
pressly mentioned in two less important provisions, which exclude "Indians not taxed"
in calculating the number of United States Representatives, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3;
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
54. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
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treaty power which vests the authority to make treaties in the Presi-
dent, and empowers the Senate to ratify all treaties by a two-thirds
vote."6 Federal authority over the Indians has been exercised under
these two provisions in an extensive and largely exclusive manner to
the present day. It should be noted that the Constitution does not ex-
pressly delineate or guarantee the right of self-government to the Indi-
ans." Hence, the constitutional authority of Congress over Indian af-
fairs has traditionally been regarded by the courts as plenary.5"
During the early years of interaction with the Indian tribes, the
United States continued the longstanding European practice of enter-
ing into treaties with Indian nations." Between 1778 and 1868, the
United States ratified a total of 370 treaties with various Indian
tribes." Indian treaties typically established the existence of peaceful
relations between the tribe and the Federal Government, restricted the
external powers of the tribe to deal independently with foreign nations,
acknowledged the semi-autonomous but dependent position of the
tribe, and promised federal protection in exchange for a promise by the
tribe to abide by the laws and Constitution of the United States.10 Al-
though the Constitution does not distinguish between Indian and other
treaties,6 1 Indian treaties have been viewed by some as being of an in-
ferior validity.6 2 One of the earliest proponents of this view was An-
drew Jackson, who wrote in 1817, "I have long viewed treaties with the
Indians an absurdity not to be reconciled with the principles of our
government."" Despite this contention, the Supreme Court has histori-
cally found Indian treaties to be of equal rank with other treaties."
One of the main objectives of Indian treaties was to provide a ve-
hicle for the peaceful acquisition of territory held by the natives in
order to obtain lands for settlement of the ever-growing population of
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
56. See Martone, supra note 52, at 603.
57. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
58. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 529-30 (1831). The first Indian treaty
ratified by the Senate was with the Delaware Nation in 1778. Treaty with the Delawares,
Sept. 17, 1778, United States-Delaware Nation, 7 Stat. 13. The terms of this treaty call
for perpetual peace and establish the parties as allies in case of war. Id. art. II. As a sign
of the liberal spirit prevailing at the time, one provision invited the Delawares to join
with other tribes to form a state with representation in Congress. Id. art. VI.
59. Martone, supra note 52, at 605. A complete compilation of the treaties concluded
between the United States and the American Indian tribes may be found in C. KAPPLER,
LAWS AND TREATIES (1902).
60. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 38-43.
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
62. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 33.
63. 2 J. BASSETr, CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 279 (1955).
64. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 559 (1832).
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the states."" The term reservation arose from the tribal practice of re-
serving tracts of land for exclusive Indian use often as part of a treaty
agreement.66 Typically, Indian treaties guaranteed the tribe perpetual
control over reservation lands, which as a rule, was respected only until
more land was needed and a new treaty was negotiated.67 In 1830, Con-
gress enacted the Indian Removal Act 8 which empowered President
Jackson to negotiate treaties to relocate the tribes east of the Missis-
sippi to "permanent" sites in Kansas and Nebraska in order to open
more land for settlement.6 9 In order to effectuate the policies of re-
moval, government officials employed many questionable means to se-
cure the agreement of the tribes to leave their territory. 0 Officials of
the War Department bribed tribal leaders to obtain their approval, and
in some cases, removal treaties were negotiated with members of the
tribe who possessed no standing or authority to speak for the group."
By the use of such tactics, the process of westward expansion contin-
ued to pick up momentum, and the Indian tribes, especially in the
east, eventually ceded or surrendered most, if not all of their original
territory.72 By the middle of the 19th century, the Indian tribes on the
whole no longer posed a serious military threat to the United States."8
In recognition of the change in the balance of power, Congress in
1871 declared that henceforth "[n]o Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States
may contract by treaty." 4 Although this declaration marks a clear ter-
mination of the treaty-making period, Congress specifically provided
that this act would in no way invalidate or impair any obligation of any
treaty ratified with any Indian tribe prior to the effective date of the
Act.715
Forty years before Congress declared an end to future treaties
with the Indian tribes, the Supreme Court addressed the sovereignty
65. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 43.
66. Cohen, supra note 30, at 35 n.17.
67. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
68. Act of May 28, 1830, 4 Stat. 411.
69. Id. See also REPORT, supra note 21, at 53-55.
70. REPORT, supra note 21, at 53-55. See also Cohen, supra note 38. There are also
reports of bounties offered for native scalps and the sale of blankets infected with small-
pox to various tribes. Id. at 6.
71. REPORT, supra note 21, at 54-55.
72. Id. at 55.
73. Id. at 56. In 1849 Congress shifted control over Indian affairs from the War De-
partment to the newly created Home Department. Id.
74. Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
75. Id.
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issue in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.76 In this case, the
tribe brought suit as a "foreign" nation to enjoin the State of Georgia
from enforcing state law within Cherokee territory.7 Without reaching
the merits of the case, the Court dismissed the complaint and held that
Indian tribes may not be considered as foreign nations for the purposes
of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Court noted
that despite the status of tribal members as aliens 79 and the history of
government recognition of the tribe as a state, the tribe, nevertheless,
could not be considered a foreign nation as it was located within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States and had acknowledged itself
to be under the protection of the Federal Government."0 The Court
concluded that the American Indian tribes would be more correctly
termed "domestic dependent nations." '
One year after the decision in Cherokee Nation, the Supreme
Court was confronted once again with the question of tribal versus
state sovereignty in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.8 2 In this case, an
American missionary was tried, convicted and sentenced for violating
Georgia law by remaining as a resident of Cherokee territory without a
permit issued by the State." Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, began his analysis by examining the various treaties entered
into between the tribe and the Federal Government which established
that the tribe had never relinquished its original right to self-govern-
ment.' In reaching the conclusion that the state law at issue was re-
pugnant to the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States,
the Chief Justice cited the now familiar doctrine of Indian law that "a
weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-
government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protec-
tion."88 Although the State of Georgia subsequently refused to abide
by the decision of the Court" with the aid and indeed encouragement
76. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 20. The Court reasoned that if the Framers had intended the Indian tribes
to be treated as foreign nations, there would have been no need to distinguish them from
foreign nations within the Commerce Clause. Id. at 18-19.
79. Id. at 16. Indians as a class were not accorded United States citizenship until the
Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (repealed and replaced 1940).
80. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
81. Id.
82. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 560-61.
85. Id.
86. See REPORT, supra note 21, at 54. Georgia courts refused to register the writ of
the Surpeme Court in the Worcester case. Id.
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of President Jackson,8 7 the decision in Worcester v. Georgia, neverthe-
less, remains a classic statement of the unique and problematic status
of the American Indian tribes. 8
In the years following the Supreme Court decisions in Cherokee
Nation and Worcester, it became increasingly apparent that these two
cases raised many more difficult issues than were resolved at the
time.89 Although it was determined that Indian tribes were "distinct
political communities"' 0 possessing the "right to self-government,"'1
the tribes were also found to be subject to the overriding sovereignty of
the United States.s2 In attempting to define the relationship of the
tribes to the Federal Government, the Court analogized this relation-
ship to that existing between a ward and his guardian. 8 However, the
extent and future of this trust responsibility remained undefined."
While the Court did clearly decide that the power of the states over
the Indian tribes was preempted, 6 the Court did not clearly establish
whether state action was preempted by the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment or of the tribe.'" In sum, in the aftermath of these decisions,
the position of the tribes within the federal system remained a difficult
conceptual and practical problem which, even 150 years later, has not
yet been conclusively determined.
During the latter half of the 19th century, attempts by the individ-
ual states to assert jurisdiction over the tribes were rejected uniformly
by the Supreme Court under a preemption analysis,'97 while federal leg-
87. See REPORT, supra note 21, at 54. President Jackson is reported to have said in
response to the decision in Worcester: "John Marshall has made his decision, now let
him enforce it?' 1 H. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1865) (emphasis in
original).
88. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 116.
89. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 54.
90. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
91. Id. at 560.
92. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
93. Id. See also Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), where the Court defined the
Indians as a "dependent community who were in a state of pupilage, advancing from the
condition of a savage tribe to that of a people who, through the discipline of labor and by
education, it was hoped might become a self-supporting and self-governing society." Id.
at 569.
94. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 55. Under the trust system as it
is presently constituted, the Federal Government holds legal title to Indian property in
trust for the benefit of the tribe. See REPORT, supra note 21, at 104. In its role as trustee,
the government is responsible for the prudent management of Indian property, and may
be held accountable for mismanagement of tribal resources. Id. at 105.
95. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
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islation restricting the sovereign powers of the tribe was upheld. 8 In
1885, for example, Congress expanded federal criminal jurisdiction to
encompass certain enumerated major crimes committed by Indians on
reservation land." In rejecting a challenge to the validity of this stat-
ute on the grounds of tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Kagama, upheld the extension of federal power over the In-
dian tribes as "necessary to their protection."1'0 0 The Court concluded
that the duty owed by the Federal Government to protect the Indians,
which arose under various treaties, 01 required that the Federal Gov-
ernment possess the power to fulfill these obligations.102 The Court
found that this was especially true in light of the fact that the tribes
"owe no allegiance to the States and receive from them no
protection."10
In 1887, Congress initiated a new policy toward the Indian tribes
by enacting legislation which provided for the dissolution and distribu-
tion of all communally owned Indian land.1' The General Allotment
Act of 1887105 authorized the President to divide tribal lands by allot-
ting separate tracts to families or individual Indians.'" Title to the
allotted land was to be held in federal trust for twenty-five years or
longer at the discretion of the President.0 7 At the end of the trust
period, the Indians were to acquire the property in fee, and the allot-
tees were to have the benefit of and be subject to all of the civil and
criminal laws of the individual states.10 8 This Act also provided that
the allottees were to gain American citizenship, and that all surplus
98. Id. at 757.
99. Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 385 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982)). This Act
expanded federal jurisdiction to cover the following seven felonies committed between
Indians: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and lar-
ceny. Id. Prior to this law, crimes committed by Indians against Indians on tribal land
were considered within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109
U.S. 556 (1883).
100. 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
101. Id.
102. Id. But see Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), where it was held that the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution is not applicable to tribal court proceed-
ings. Id. This rule was later limited by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 77-78
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982)).
103. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
104. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
358 (1982)).
105. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 348.
108. Id. § 349.
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lands remaining after allotment were to be sold to the United States. 09
As a direct result of these allotment policies, the total amount of land
collectively owned by American Indian tribes decreased from approxi-
mately 140 million acres in 1887 to fifty million acres some forty years
later.110 Moreover, because many of the allottees were not well-versed
in American property concepts, they were easy prey for unscrupulous
creditors, and by the 1920's there were estimated to be over 100,000
landless Indians."'
Throughout the Allotment period, the Supreme Court continued
to reject attempts by the states to assert jurisdiction over the tribes
which still were subject to the trust relationship.' In The Kansas In-
dians,"' for example, the Supreme Court employed a preemption anal-
ysis to invalidate a state property tax on Indian land held in common
where the State had alleged that the Indians should be subject to State
law because they had abandoned many tribal customs." 4 The preemp-
tion doctrine was applied again in United States v. Celestine'" to bar
a state criminal prosecution against an Indian allottee even though his
land was held in fee and the allottee had become a United States citi-
zen under the Allotment Act.'" The Court reasoned that because Con-
gress had extended the expiration date of the trust period," 7 the Fed-
eral Government did not intend to yield jurisdiction over the Indians
to the states by virtue of a grant of citizenship." 8 Similarly, in United
States v. Nice,"9 the Court held that American citizenship "is not in-
compatible with tribal existence."' 0
In addition to defending the sovereignty of the tribes against en-
croachment by the states, the Supreme Court also consistently rejected
challenges to tribal sovereignty brought by citizens who claimed to be
aggrieved by tribal action.12' In Roff v. Burney,12 2 for example, the
109. Id. See also United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909), where it was held
that even though citizenship was granted to an allottee before the end of the trust pe-
riod, a state may not exercise jurisdiction over that allottee until the trust period is
actually terminated. Id. at 290-91.
110. REPORT, supra note 21, at 67.
111. Id. at 72.
112. See The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S.
278 (1909).
113. 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
114. Id.
115. 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
116. Id.
117. Act of May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1982)).
118. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 281 (1909).
119. 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
120. Id. at 598.
121. See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), where it was held that inheritance
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Court upheld the inherent power of the tribe to confer or withdraw
tribal citizenship privileges. 2 The Court decided that the only limits
on the exercise of tribal power over internal affairs are those imposed
by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 2 ' In Morris v.
Hitchcock, 25 the Court validated a tribal permit tax imposed on non-
Indians who were granted the privilege of using tribal lands to graze
cattle."' In this case, the tribal power to tax was upheld on the basis of
the tribe's inherent right to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands and
the sovereign right of the tribal government to impose taxes in order to
raise revenue.12 7 In Buster v. Wright, 8 the Eighth Circuit upheld the
tribal power to tax nonmembers even though the persons taxed had a
legal right as property owners to remain on the reservation.'" The
Court concluded that the tribe possessed the authority to tax based
upon its inherent power to govern all of the people within its bor-
ders.12 0 Finally, in Turner v. United States,'31 the Court held that an
Indian tribe possesses sovereign immunity and may not be sued in any
court without specific congressional authorization or tribal consent. 32
During the first three decades of the 20th century, Congress con-
tinued the federal policies of assimilation initiated under the Allot-
ment Act." In 1924, Congress extended American citizenship to all
non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United
States.1 3 4 In the same year, Congress authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to lease unallotted lands for oil and gas mining purposes, and
for the first time, permitted the states to tax mineral production on
Indian lands as long as the tax was not employed as a lien against tri-
bal property." In 1929, Congress delegated even greater authority to
the states over Indian affairs, by enacting measures to permit the
rights of tribal members are controlled by tribal law, rather than by federal regulations
or state law. Id.
122. 168 U.S. 218 (1897).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 222.
125. 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 389.
128. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 384 (1905).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 952.
131. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
132. Id. at 358.
133. Indian General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1982).
134. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (repealed 1940).
135. Act of May 29, 1924, 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982).
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states to enter tribal lands to enforce state health and sanitation stan-
dards as well as compulsory school attendance of Indian children.136
After forty years of assimilation policies, Congress inaugurated a
new federal Indian policy in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.137
The major features of this Act were the termination of the prior allot-
ment policies and the extension of federal recognition and support for
tribal self-government.""8 This Act provided for the preservation of all
existing tribal powers and conferred additional powers of self-govern-
ment upon all tribes which adopted a constitution and bylaws pursu-
ant to the Act.'3" While the tribes were also given the option to exclude
themselves from the provisions of the Act,'14 whether the tribes de-
cided to organize themselves under its provisions or not, all treaty and
statutory rights vested in the tribe were to remain intact. 4 '
For the next twenty years after the passage of the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act, national policy toward the Indians reaffirmed this new fed-
eral commitment to supporting efforts at Indian self-determination
and redressing many longstanding grievances of the tribes. The Min-
eral Leasing Act of 1938,141 for example, authorized the Indians to
make the initial decision to lease tribal lands, unlike earlier statutes
which vested such authority in the Federal Government.' 3 Special ju-
risdictional statutes were enacted by Congress to permit certain tribes
to sue the Federal Government for tribal treaty violations. 44 In one
such case decided by the Supreme Court in 1938, the Shoshone tribe
recovered an award of 4.4 million dollars in compensation for the gov-
ernment's conveyance of a portion of tribal property to another tribe
without Shoshone consent.' 5 While the Supreme Court did acknowl-
edge that the Federal Government could appropriate Indian lands,
46
the Court emphasized that the taking of congressionally recognized tri-
bal land required that just compensation be paid to the tribe. 47 In
1946, Congress decided to resolve all outstanding Indian claims against
136. Act of Feb. 15, 1929, 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1982).
137. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1982).
138. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 478.
141. Id. § 478b.
142. Act of May 11, 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1982).
143. See, e.g., Act of May 29, 1924, 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982). It should be noted that
claims based on the abolition of executive order (as opposed to congressionally author-
ized) reservations are not compensable under the fifth amendment. See Sioux Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 330 (1942).
144. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 302, 44 Stat. 1349.
145. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
146. Id. at 115.
147. Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 479 (1937).
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the government by establishing the Indian Claims Commission.1 4 8 This
Commission was authorized to review any Indian claim whether arising
under treaty, contract or otherwise, notwithstanding any statute of
limitations or laches, as long as the claim had accrued prior to the ef-
fective date of the Act.
1 4 9
During the 1950's, federal Indian policy began to shift again. In
1953, Congress delegated to the respective states criminal jurisdiction
over most of the Indians living within their boundaries and the terri-
tory of Alaska. 150 Congress also provided a general authorization to any
state to extend its criminal jurisdiction over the Indians living within
state boundaries."' In 1954, Congress went even further toward reviv-
ing the once discarded assimilation policies by authorizing the Secre-
tary of the Interior to terminate the federal trust responsibility over
certain named tribes determined by Congress to no longer be in need
of federal protection.5 " Although these termination policies were aban-
doned soon thereafter,15 3 federal protection of a significant number of
Indian tribes was withdrawn during this period.' " It should be noted,
however, that the termination acts did not affect any of the powers
vested in the tribes to take any action which did not previously require
federal authorization. 15
5
Federal Indian policy shifted back toward the support of tribal
self-government, or at least acquiescence to its continued existence,
when Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.5' The ma-
jor provisions of this Act acknowledge the tribes' power of self-govern-
ment, but impose upon the tribal governments restraints similar, but
not identical, to the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution.
1 5 7
Consequently, tribal governments are required to extend to anyone
148. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 70 (1982)).
149. 25 U.S.C. § 70(a) (1976). The Commission was limited to resolving only those
claims which had accrued prior to Aug. 13, 1946. Id.
150. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982)).
151. Id. See also REPORT, supra note 21, at 200-02.
152. Act of Aug. 13, 1954, 68 Stat. 722 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 564(q) (1982)).
153. See REPORT, supra note 21, at 151.
154. Id. at 451. See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). In
the aftermath of termination, some tribes like the Menominee formed native corpora-
tions to manage the property of the tribe. Id. at 408. But see Act of Dec. 22, 1973, 25
U.S.C. §§ 903a-903f (1982), where federal supervision over the Menominee tribe was re-
stored by Congress.
155. Act of Aug. 13, 1954, 25 U.S.C. § 564(q) (1982). See also Kimball v. Callahan,
493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974), where tribal fishing and hunt-
ing rights which arose under treaty survived termination among the Klamath tribe. 493
F.2d at 569.
156. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982)).
157. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
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within their jurisdiction the equal protection of tribal law.15 8 Further,
persons subject to detention by the tribe are accorded the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts."' Other provisions of
the Act limit the authority of tribal courts to impose penalties. For
example, punishment may not exceed 500 dollars and six months im-
prisonment for any single offense.' Although this Act also contains
provisions whereby the Federal Government gives its consent to any
state to assert civil or criminal jurisdiction over the Indians located
within its borders, the Act provides that any state which has not as-
serted jurisdiction over the Indians may not assume such jurisdiction
without the consent of the tribe."' This Act also provides for trust
property to continue as exempt from state taxation. 6" The states are
expressly directed to give full force and effect to tribal civil laws which
are not inconsistent with state law.'
6 3
Federal legislation since 1968 has continued to recognize the right
of the Indian tribes to exercise the powers of self-government as con-
sistent with the current national policy of promoting Indian self-deter-
mination.'6 Although the shifting national policies toward Indian af-
fairs during the past two hundred years certainly offer no guarantee for
the future of tribal self-government,' " it is clear, nonetheless, that In-
dian tribes have retained a significant degree of control over their in-
ternal affairs. They are unlikely to willingly relinquish this control in
the near future.' 6
II
In the 150 years that have transpired since the landmark case of
Worcester v. Georgia,' the notion that states are preempted from ex-
ercising jurisdiction over the Indians within their borders has under-
gone considerable change. In the area of criminal law, for example,
158. Id. § 1302(8).
159. Id. § 1303.
160. Id. § 1302(7).
161. Id. §§ 1321-1322.
162. Id. § 1322(b).
163. Id. § 1322(c).
164. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of Jan. 4,
1975, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982)).
165. See, e.g., the statement of former Interior Secretary Watt, where the reserva-
tions were described as "an example of the failure of socialism." N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1983, at A19, col. 3.
166. See, e.g., statements by the newly elected Navajo Chairman to the effect that
the tribe will no longer allow reservation resources to be exploited by others. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1982, at A16, col. 1.
167. 31 U.S. 515.
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many states have assumed jurisdiction over the Indians within their
state by virtue of congressional delegation of that authority."' 8 In a re-
cent decision by the Supreme Court,16 9 the majority decided that even
in the absence of an express assumption of criminal jurisdiction by the
state, Indian tribes no longer possess ."inherent jurisdiction to try and
punish non-Indians" in tribal courts.170 It should be noted, however,
that tribal courts have retained the power to enforce tribal criminal
laws against members of the tribe17 1 and the Double Jeopardy Clause
has been held not to bar both tribal and federal prosecutions since
they are brought by different sovereigns.172 Tribal courts also have re-
tained exclusive jurisdiction over contract suits by nonmembers against
members of the tribe when such suits arise from on-reservation trans-
actions.17 9 Tribal courts also possess exclusive jurisdiction over adop-
tion proceedings which arise on the reservation and involve only tribal
members who reside on reservation lands. 17 4 Moreover, the Supreme
Court stated recently that where Congress specifically has delegated
authority to the tribe, the tribe may enforce its regulations against In-
dians and non-Indians alike.1
75
Despite the trend toward permitting the states to assume criminal
jurisdiction, especially where non-Indians are involved, the preemption
doctrine continues to be relevant in many civil matters.176 In McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Commission,7 7 for example, the Supreme
Court held that a state may not impose its personal income tax on a
reservation Indian whose entire income derives from reservation
168. See REPORT, supra note 21, at 201-02. The delegation of authority to the states
for the assumption of jurisdiction over Indian lands has been criticized by Indians and
non-Indians alike. Id. at 204-08. In its report to Congress, the Commission recommended
that legislation be enacted to provide for retrocession of jurisdiction to the tribes at the
option of the tribal governments. Id. at 208.
169. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
170. Id. at 212.
171. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
172. Id. at 329-30. The Court stated that because "tribal and federal prosecutions are
brought by separate sovereigns, they are not 'for the same offence' and the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause thus does not bar one when the other has occurred." Id.
173. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
174. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976).
175. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
176. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 590 (1832). The preemption doc-
trine, as applied to Indian law, refers to the general rule that the states are precluded
from exercising jurisdiction within Indian territory unless that power is expressly dele-
gated by Congress or the matter at issue involves non-Indians under a law of general
application. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 117.
177. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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sources.1 7 8 In an even more recent case, Moe v. Salish and Koatenai
Tribes,79 the Court held that a state may not impose its personal
property tax, sales tax or vendor license fees on Indians who conduct
business with other Indians on the reservation."'0 It is significant, how-
ever, that the Court did uphold the power of the state to require an
Indian vendor to collect a state sales tax on reservation sales to non-
Indians. Such a requirement was found not to impose a 'burden which
frustrates tribal self-government."' 81 Where the state tax is applied to
an area of traditional federal involvement, however, state action is pre-
empted, even where the activity involves non-Indians."8 2
In the most recent case to arise in the area of state taxation,
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville,'" the Supreme Court
decided that although a state sales tax could not be levied on reserva-
tion sales to tribal members, the same tax was valid when applied to
on-reservation sales to Indians who were not members of the tribe.'"
The Court found that there was no conflict between the state and tri-
bal taxing schemes, "since each government is free to impose its taxes
without ousting the other."'' 8 In assessing the validity of the tribal tax,
the Court stated "While the tribes do have an interest in raising reve-
nue for essential governmental programs, that interest is strongest
when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation
by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipi-
ent of tribal services.'
86
The tribal power to impose taxes upon nonmembers has consist-
ently been upheld by the courts despite the argument that the tribes
may not tax those who are precluded from representation in tribal gov-
ernment. 8 7 In most cases of tribal taxation arising in the past, the tax
imposed has invariably been one of the sales, license or permit type,
which generally involve minimal fees.188 Recently, however, at least one
tribe has gone beyond the traditional permit tax to impose a severance
tax on the production of non-Indian mineral lessees which reportedly
178. Id. at 165.
179. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
180. Id. at 480.
181. Id. at 483.
182. White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980).
183. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
184. Id. at 159.
185. Id. at 158.
186. Id. at 156-57.
187. See, e.g., Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
188. Id. at 554. The license tax imposed here was three cents per year for grazing
land and fifteen cents per year for farm land. Id. See also Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S.
384 (1904), where the permit tax upheld by the Court was $25 per year. Id. at 389.
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will generate in excess of two million dollars in annual revenue for the
tribe. 8 9 In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,190 the lessees are
twenty-one oil and gas production companies that challenged the
power of the tribe to impose such a tax.l 9e On their appeal to the Su-
preme Court, the lessees urged that a tribe's power to tax nonmembers
is based solely on the power to exclude nonmembers from tribal land.
Because the tax was not imposed until after the leases were executed,
and because the power to tax was not reserved in those leases, the les-
sees argued that the tribe could not impose such a tax.""2 The lessees
further urged, in the alternative, that even if the tribe possessed the
power to impose the tax after executing the leases, the tax at issue here
violated the Commerce Clause by imposing a multiple burden on inter-
state commerce in view of the pre-existing state severance tax on min-
eral production."'3
After examining each of the arguments advanced by the lessees,
the majority of the Court held that the severance tax imposed by the
tribe was valid. 94 The Court concluded that the tribal power to tax
nonmembers is derived not only from the power to exclude nonmem-
bers from tribal land, but also from the "inherent power necessary to
tribal self-government and territorial management." '95 While the Court
did acknowledge that Congress could eliminate the tribal power to tax,
the majority stressed the fact that the tax ordinance at issue had been
approved through a congressionally authorized procedure, and thus,
was consistent with federal policies.'9 The Court also concluded that a
tribe may lease communal property in its role as partner in a commer-
cial venture without relinquishing any of its power as a sovereign to
impose a tax at a later date. 97 The majority emphasized that a "non-
member's presence and conduct on Indian lands is conditioned by the
189. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 539-40 (10th Cir. 1980).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 539. The Court of Appeals held the tax to be valid. Id.
192. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
193. Id. at 158 n.26.
194. Id. at 159. The Court concluded that the tribe never yielded its authority to tax,
whether this power is deemed to arise from the inherent power of the tribe to exclude
nonmembers or the inherent power of tribal self-government. Id.
195. Id. at 141. The Court noted that although the power to exclude nonmembers
from tribal land is considered to be the hallmark of tribal sovereignty, it is not the sole
basis on which the tribe may assert its power to tax. Id. at 141-42.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 145-46. The Court stressed that to hold otherwise would impose a serious
financial burden on the tribe to provide governmental services without permitting the
tribe to generate the income necessary to pay for essential services. Id. at 145 n.10.
[Vol. 4
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
limitations the Tribe may choose to impose,""" and a waiver of tribal
sovereignty may not be inferred from silence in a commercial agree-
ment with a sovereign. 199 The Court also pointed out that the tribe's
power to impose its own severance tax is not preempted by a similar
state tax in view of the fact that different sovereigns may tax the same
transaction.2 00 Although the Court found it unnecessary to review the
tax under the Commerce Clause, in light of the congressional proce-
dures established for approval of tribal ordinances, the Court con-
cluded that this tax would be upheld if subjected to such scrutiny.2 '
III
Although the Federal Government continues to hold the exclusive
right to terminate aboriginal title,210 it is evident from the decision in
Merrion0 s that Indian tribes have retained the fundamentally impor-
tant sovereign right to exercise control over the use and management
of tribal property.20 4 In view of the vast natural resources which remain
within tribal control,' 0 it is not unreasonable to assume that Indian
tribes will be encouraged to assert their sovereign rights over the fu-
ture development of reservation resources in the aftermath of the Mer-
rion decision.0 6
In recent years, a number of tribes have brought suit to recover
tribal lands which were ceded or taken unlawfully.2 1 In recognition of
198. Id. at 147.
199. Id. at 148. The Court recognized that "sovereign power, even when unexercised,
is an enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction,
and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms." Id.
200. Id. at 151. According to the majority, "each government is free to impose its
taxes without ousting the other." Id.
201. Id. at 156.
202. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1973);
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 566 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Railway, 135 U.S. 641, 657 (1890).
203. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
204. Id.
205. See REPoRT, supra note 21, at 308-39.
206. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A16, col. 1. The newly elected Navajo
Chairman, who presides over the tribe's 24,000 square-mile reservation, has vowed to
renegotiate the terms of old mineral leasing agreements and to devote reservation re-
sources to the benefit of the tribe. Id.
207. See, e.g., Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 968 (1981); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d
370 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Oneida Nation, 576 F.2d 870 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Narra-
gansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern Rhode Island Land Development Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976). See also Note, Indian Sovereignty and Eastern Indian Land
Claims, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 921 (1982).
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the serious threat posed to the title of current landowners by suits of
this type, Congress has responded by enacting legislation to resolve the
claims of various tribes. Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act,205 for example, Congress set out to resolve all present and poten-
tial claims of some two hundred Alaskan Indian groups." 9 The major
features of this Act provide for the extinguishment of all aboriginal
titles and claims based on use and occupancy,1 0 in exchange for the
establishment of regional corporations." These corporations are to be
entrusted with the responsibility for the management of approximately
twenty-two million acres of land granted to the corporations212 and the
distribution of dividends to the native stockholders.21 2 Although some
tribes have voluntarily incorporated under prior termination acts,2"
the creation of native corporations under the Alaskan Settlement Act
marks the first time that Congress has imposed this approach on such
a large scale.21 5 While it is too soon to judge the success of this ap-
proach, it should be noted that Congress did not adopt this strategy in
the more recent settlement of claims involving three Maine Indian
tribes.21 Under the terms of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement
Act,217 Congress implicitly reaffirmed the traditional federal commit-
ment to the trust system by appropriating 81.5 million dollars for the
purchase of land to be held by the Federal Government in trust for the
benefit of the tribes.21i
Although some Indian claimants may be denied compensation
based upon the finding that they no longer engage in tribal relations, "
208. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-27 (1976)).
209. 43 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1976).
210. Id. § 1603.
211. Id. §§ 1606-1607.
212. Id. § 1611. See also N.Y. Times, July 12, 1983, at D5, col. 4. Another twenty-two
million acres is to be distributed to 271 native villages that will also share in the cash
settlement. Id.
213. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)-(m) (1976).
214. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). A corporation
was formed to manage tribal property and the reservation was to be integrated into state
government as a county. Id. Federal supervision of the Menominee was subsequently
restored by the Act of Dec. 22, 1973, 25 U.S.C. § 903(a)-(f) (1982).
215. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976)). Congress
appropriated 462.5 million dollars to establish an Alaskan Native Fund which is to be
used to purchase lands to be allotted to the native corporations. Id. § 1605.
216. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1885 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1721 (1982)).
217. 25 U.S.C. § 1721 (1982).
218. Id. § 1721(5).
219. See, e.g., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). See also Montoya v. United States, 108 U.S. 261 (1901). The
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if the settlements of these recent suits are any indication, the potential
claims of cognizable tribes are not insubstantial. In a recent settlement
with the Sioux Nation, for example,22 0 the Supreme Court affirmed an
award of 17.1 million dollars plus five percent interest since 1877 for
the illegal taking of the Black Hills reservation in violation of treaty
obligations with the tribe.2 1 Thus, while the Federal Government may
have the power to terminate aboriginal title and take full control over
Indian lands, there remains a serious question as to whether the gov-
ernment could afford to settle all of the potential claims for just com-
pensation which undoubtedly would arise from such a drastic course of
action.
Despite assurances by the Reagan administration that the Federal
Government has no plans to terminate the reservation system,212 it is
clear that neither the government nor the tribes are satisfied by the
present state of affairs.223 Economic conditions have forced many reser-
vation businesses to either cut production or cease operations alto-
gether, which in turn has caused unemployment to rise well above fifty
percent on some reservations.22 4 At the same time, the Federal Govern-
ment has cut back funding for reservation job training programs, and
private investment in reservation enterprises has all but disap-
peared.2 25 While Indian leaders continue to disagree on many other is-
sues, 2 6 there appears to be a general consensus developing within the
Indian community that increased tribal control over reservation re-
Montoya Court defined a tribe as a "body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united
in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though
sometimes ill-defined territory." Id. at 266.
220. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). The Court con-
cluded that although Congress has paramount authority over tribal property, this "power
does not extend so far as to enable the Government to give the tribal lands to others, or
to appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering or assuming an obligation to
render, just compensation." Id. at 408.
221. Id. at 424.
222. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1983, at A8, col. 4.
223. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1983, at A19, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A16,
col. 1.
224. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1983, at A8, col. 1. Unemployment among the San
Carlos Apaches was reported to reach almost 70% during 1982. Id. Unemployment on
the Spokane reservation was also reported close to 75% at the end of 1982. See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 6, 1983, at A19, col. 1. In the wake of the recent decision in Seminole Tribe
v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982) (barring
enforcement of state gaming laws on Indian reservations), a number of tribes have begun
to operate high-stakes bingo games on the reservation in order to raise revenue for the
tribe and reduce unemployment on the reservation. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1983, at
Al, col. 2.
225. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1983, at A8, col. 1.
226. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A16, col. 3.
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sources is essential to the success of any plan for tribal self-
sufficiency.2
2 7
CONCLUSION
American Indian tribes continue to be recognized as "unique ag-
gregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their mem-
bers and their territory." 2 ' It appears that as long as the Indians con-
tinue to engage in tribal relations and remain as distinct political
communities, they will continue to possess a unique, semi-sovereign
status within the United States.229 Treaty rights, which arose at a time
when the tribes were truly independent, continue as enforceable vested
rights which distinguish the Indian peoples from all other American
citizens. 2 0 The sovereign rights of the Indian tribes clearly are of a
limited character and persist at the will of Congress. However, practi-
cal considerations make it most unlikely that the tribes will be forced
to relinquish these vested rights, at least in the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile, the concept of Indian tribal sovereignty will continue to
evolve as Indian people strive to preserve tribal relations and tribal
governments continue to test the limits of their power as domestic de-
pendent sovereigns.
James H. Gianninoto
227. Id. at col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, June 2, 1983, at A18, col. 4, where the Na-
tional Tribal Chairmen's Association challenged the Reagan administration to live up to
its promise to ease federal restrictions on tribal self-government. See also R. BARSH & J.
HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 280-82, where the authors outline a proposed Constitu-
tional amendment designed to secure political representation for the tribes tantamount
to statehood.
228. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
229. See United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1981).
230. Id. at 1372.
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